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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Closing the
Courtroom Door to Environmental
Plaintiffs - The Endangered Species
Act Remains Confined to United
States Borders
Respected scientists estimate that as many as two million species will
be extinct by the year 2000, primarily as a result of habitat destruc-
tion, including tropical deforestation, and construction of massive
dams and highways in developing countries. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental problems such as acid rain, global warming and
endangered species do not recognize national borders, and neither
should environmental laws. For years environmentalists have been
unsuccessful in their attempts to force the United States government
to comply with its own environmental laws abroad. 2 A short-lived
breakthrough occurred in August 1990, when the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") 3 ap-
plied to federally funded projects outside the United States.4 In De-
fenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,5 environmental groups challenged a 1986
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior which limited
the applicability of the ESA's section 7 consultation provision to
agency actions occurring only "in the United States or upon the high
seas."' 6 Ruling in favor of the environmental organizations, the
1. Patrick A. Parenteau, No US. Aid if Species Are Endangered?, CoNN. L. TRIB., Mar.
11, 1991, Commentary, at 23.
2. See NRDC v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
that National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not apply to federal action abroad).
See generally Jonathan Turley, Legal Theory: "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and
the Presumption Against Exterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598, 627-34 (1990).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
4. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
2008 (1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
5. Id
6. Id at 118.
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Eighth Circuit held that Congress intended the ESA's consultation
requirement to extend to agency action in foreign countries. 7
However, on June 12, 1992, the same day President Bush arrived
at the Rio Earth Summit to defend criticism of his environmental rec-
ord,8 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's
decision, leaving intact the regulation that federal agencies need not
comply with the ESA when funding projects abroad. 9 In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 10 the Supreme Court held that the environmen-
tal groups were not sufficiently injured by the regulation and thus
lacked standing to challenge the regulation in court. " By overturning
the Defenders of Wildlife decision on procedural grounds, the
Supreme Court declined an opportunity to shape the issue of extrater-
ritorial application of United States environmental laws. Defenders of
Wildlife is the Supreme Court's latest decision narrowing standing for
environmental plaintiffs while simultaneously broadening the powers
of the executive branch.
This Note will first present a brief overview of the concept behind
the Endangered Species Act - the preservation of biological diver-
sity. It will then examine the history of the Endangered Species Act.
In particular, this Note will discuss the importance of the section 7
consultation provision, the procedural background and legal analysis
of the Defenders of Wildlife case, and the Supreme Court's reversal.
This Note will also explore the way in which the Court's general pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of United States law con-
fiicts with the need to respond to environmental problems on an
international level. Finally, this Note will assert that, in light of con-
gressional commitment to the worldwide preservation of species and
the global scope of the endangered species crisis, the Supreme Court's
reversal was both inconsistent and inimical to these efforts.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Necessity of Preserving Biological Diversity
"Biodiversity refers to the variety and variability among living
organisms and the ecological complexes in which they occur."1 2 A
7. Id. at 125.
8. David G. Savage, Court Upholds Bush Wildlife Policy Limits, L.A. TIMES, June 13,
1992, at Al.
9. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 1989 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY 20TH ANN. REP., at 295.
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loss of biodiversity has both environmental and economic conse-
quences. "Of the world's approximately 240,000 species of plants,
only about 3,000 have even been used as food, only 150 have been
cultivated on any scale, and a mere 20 account for over 85 percent of
present human consumption."' 13 These statistics suggest the over-
whelming potential that undiscovered wild plant species have as alter-
native resources for future generations.
Advocates of species protection argue that there are compelling
scientific, economic and ethical arguments for the preservation of spe-
cies. The vast destruction of many species threatens the advance of
biomedical knowledge. I4 "[E]ndangered species may possess chemi-
cal or medical properties that will never be discovered if the creatures
are rendered extinct."15 For example, in enacting the ESA, Congress
noted that oral contraceptives were made possible with the discovery
of certain chemical properties in a previously unstudied and otherwise
useless plant.16 Moreover, species of plants and animals may eventu-
ally provide the cure to cancer. 17 According to Dr. Thomas Eisner,
Division of Biological Sciences, Cornell University:
[M]any of the most interesting plant drugs in current use were only
recently discovered, including for example some of the an-
tileukemic compounds, and anticancer drugs such as vincristine,
used in the treatment of Hodgkin's disease. There is no end to the
potential for discovery in nature, because we have only begun the
chemical exploration of nature.' 8
Species preservation is not only necessary for the discovery of
13. GEORGE LEDEC & ROBERT GOODLAND, WILDLANDS: THEIR PROTECTION AND
MANAGEMENT IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 10 (1988).
14. Edwin Smith, The Endangered Species Act and Biological Conservation, 57 S. CAL. L.
REv. 361, 374 (1984).
15. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Para-
digm and its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. RrF. 805, 823 (1986). During the Senate Endan-
gered Species Act Oversight Hearings, Dr. Thomas E. Lovejoy of the World Wildlife Fund
stated:
[Mian-caused extinctions are limiting the potential growth of knowledge and consti-
tute a form of bookburning of a very frightening sort - burning of books that have
yet to be written.... Should we throw away the owner's manual to our car before we
even know the names of all the parts?
Id. n.60.
16. Smith, supra note 14, at 375; see also H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1973).
17. Smith, supra note 14, at 375 n.56.
18. Endangered Species Act Oversight- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 368
(1981).
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new medicines, but is also critical to the maintenance of a diverse gene
pool that could adapt to the world's continuing stresses. Genetic di-
versity assures the flexibility needed to cope with environmental
change and variation. Preserving genetic variability will protect the
world's food supply from the constant onslaught of new parasites and
diseases. 19 For instance, maintaining "diversity of species here and
abroad serves U.S. agriculture by providing a reservoir of genetic
traits that crop and livestock breeders may need in the future." 20 By
destroying species without evaluating their potential, "we may lose
precisely those resources that could make it possible to support the
expanding world population. '21 Our human existence clearly de-
pends on the biological resources of the world.
Similarly, there are economic justifications for preserving wild
plants and animals. Currently unknown or unstudied plant and
animal species may produce new industrial products. For example, it
was recently discovered that Copaifera langsdorfii, a tree which only
grows in northern Brazil, produces sap that can be used directly as
fuel in diesel engines.22 In an oil-short world, the economic value of
such species is impossible to quantify.
The ethical arguments for species preservation go beyond re-
search and resource value. Many species also possess aesthetic and
recreational value. Some commentators have argued that the destruc-
tion of species results in a diminished appreciation for the value of all
life by callously causing pain in some living entities.23 Others argue
that a moral obligation exists to protect the interests of future genera-
tions.24 Because species extinction is irreversible, maintaining biologi-
cal diversity preserves for future generations the opportunity to both
use and enjoy these natural resources. 25 Harvard biologist, E.O. Wil-
son, commenting on the threat to global biological diversity, wrote:
The worst thing that can happen - will happen - is not energy
depletion, economic collapse, limited nuclear war, or conquest by a
totalitarian government. As terrible as these catastrophes would
be for us, they can be repaired within a few generations. The one
process ongoing in the 1980s that will take millions of years to
19. Smith, supra note 14, at 374.
20. 1990 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY 21sT ANN. REP., at 147.
21. Smith, supra note 14, at 374.
22. LEDEC & GOODLAND, supra note 13, at 13.
23. Smith, supra note 14, at 376-77.
24. Id. at 376.
25. Id.
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correct is the loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruc-
tion of natural habitats. This is the folly our descendants are least
likely to forgive us. 26
In order to adequately address the scientific, economic and ethi-
cal concerns for species preservation, the United States government
must respond to the problem of biological diversity on a global level.
Scientists project that by the end of the century an average of 100
species per day will vanish from the Earth as a result of pollution, the
growth in human population and the massive destruction of the rain
forests.27 Thus, it is urgent that the United States government coordi-
nate its efforts to stop the loss of global biodiversity.
B. History of the Endangered Species Act
United States efforts to protect wildlife and wild habitats through
domestic and international laws date back to the Lacey Act of 190028
and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1916.29 However, the most
comprehensive and controversial wildlife legislation is the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973.30 Concerned with decreasing biological
diversity, Congress enacted the ESA with the express purpose of pre-
serving endangered and threatened species and their habitats.31
Prior to the passage of the ESA, the scope of endangered species
legislation was significantly more limited. The Endangered Species
Preservation Act of 196632 was the first legislation enacted specifically
to protect endangered species. The Act called for the listing of fish
and wildlife that were near actual extinction so that special protection
26. 1985 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY 16TH ANN. REP., at 273.
27. See Rudy Abramson, Wildlife Act: Shield or Sword?; Battle Brews over Changing the
'Crown Jewel' of Environmental Statutes Business Feels Skewered by the Law. Conservationists
Want More Protection for Endangered Species, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1990, at Al. Abramson
states:
Scientists estimate that about 100 species disappeared from the Earth between 1600
and 1900, but with the spread of pollution, the press of human populations, and
massive destruction of the rain forests, projections are that an average of 100 species
per day will be vanishing by the end of the century.
Id
28. Act of May 25, 1900, 31 Stat. 188 (commonly known as the Lacey Act). See 16
U.S.C. § 3372(a) (1988).
29. Convention between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migra-
tory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702.
30. James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup
Look from a Litigator's Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 500-01 (1991).
31. Henry J. Blum, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act, 13 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 129, 129 (1987).
32. Pub. L. No. 89-669, §§ 1-3, 80 Stat. 926 (1966).
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could be provided. 33 Neither foreign species nor plant species were
eligible for this listing process.3 The Endangered Species Conserva-
tion Act of 196935 amended the 1966 Act. The 1969 Act expanded
the endangered species program by recognizing the need to list for-
eign species. 36 In order "to help insure that the United States does
not contribute to the extirpation of other nations' wildlife, the Secre-
tary of Interior was authorized to develop a list of species or subspe-
cies of animals that were threatened with worldwide extinction." 37 In
addition, the 1969 Act prohibited the importation of any listed foreign
species into the United States. 38
Four years later, Congress substantially expanded the coverage
of the endangered species program when it enacted the Endangered
Species Act of 1973. 39 The 1973 Act provided for the listing of plant
species,4 and also created the category of "threatened" 41 species. A
species no longer had to be on the verge of extinction before qualify-
ing for protection. Overall, the ESA of 1973 created an elaborate
framework for identifying and listing threatened or endangered spe-
cies, for prohibiting federal agencies from jeopardizing listed species,
and for restricting actions that could result in the taking, directly or
indirectly, of listed species.42
C. Section 7 Consultation Provison
Because courts have been quite active in enforcing the require-
ments of the ESA, the Act has become a powerful tool in environmen-
tal litigation.43 One of the most significant provisions of the Act is
section 7.4 Entitled "Interagency Cooperation," section 7 is intended
33. Kilbourne, supra note 30, at 502-03.
34. Id at 503.
35. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969).
36. See Kilbourne, supra note 30, at 503.
37. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989,
2990-91.
38. S. REp. No. 240, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2700,
2701.
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
40. Kilbourne, supra note 30, at 503.
41. Id. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1973) (defining threatened species as "any species
which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or
a significant portion of its range").
42. Kilbourne, supra note 30, at 501.
43. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978) (holding that
"Congress viewed the value of endangered species as incalculable," Court authorized injunc-
tion to halt completion of multi-million dollar dam in order to preserve snail darter fish).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
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to protect listed species from the potentially harmful effects of federal
agency action.45 This provision limits the actions a federal agency
may undertake as well as imposing affirmative duties for the protec-
tion of species.46 Unlike the National Environmental Protection Act
("NEPA"),47 which requires only procedural compliance,48 section 7
of the ESA contains a substantive prohibition.49
Section 7(a)(1) imposes an affirmative duty on federal agencies to
carry out projects for the conservation of listed species. 50 Under sec-
tion 7(a)(2), federal agencies must consult with the Secretary of the
Interior to ensure that their actions will not harm any listed endan-
gered or threatened species. 51 Each federal agency must inquire as to
whether any listed species "may be present in the area of [its] pro-
posed action." 52 Depending on the species involved, the Secretary has
delegated the consultation task to either the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS") or the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS"). If the FWS or NMFS advises the agency that a listed
species may be present, the agency is required to prepare a biological
assessment identifying the endangered or threatened species that are
"likely to be affected by such action. a53 This biological assessment
must be completed before the agency can enter into any contract for
construction. 54 This requirement ensures informed decision-making
45. Kilbourne, supra note 30, at 526. Section 4 of the ESA determines which species will
receive protection under the Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988).
46. Kilbourne, supra note 30, at 525.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(c) (1988).
48. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
(holding "NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary
process").
49. See Plater, supra note 15, at 821. See also Kilbourne, supra note 30, at 526.
50. See Kilbourne, supra note 30, at 525. Section 7(a)(l) states: "All other Federal agen-
cies shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities
in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of
endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title." 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1988).
51. See Kilbourne, supra note 30, at 526. Section 7(a)(2) states:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secre-
tary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency... is
not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of
such species ....
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
52. Id. § 1536(c)(1).
53. Id
54. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(b)(2) (1991).
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on the part of the federal agencies, and thus provides significant pro-
tection to listed species.
The Department of the Interior administers the ESA by promul-
gating regulations. The first set of regulations, issued in 1978, re-
quired federal agencies to comply with the consultation provision
even if the activity was being carried out in a foreign country." How-
ever, in 1983 the Department of the Interior, under the management
of the Reagan Administration, proposed to rescind the consultation
requirement for agency actions in foreign countries.5 6 On June 3,
1986, the Secretary of the Interior published the revised rule which
stated that the consultation requirement would apply only to agency
action "in the United States or upon the high seas." 57 The Depart-
ment cited "the apparent domestic orientation of the consultation and
exemption processes... and... the potential for interference with the
sovereignty of foreign nations"581 as justifications for this radical
reversal.
Under the revised regulation, federal agencies acting abroad are
no longer required to consider the environmental impact of their ac-
tions on endangered and threatened species in foreign countries. This
regulation primarily affects government agencies that either fund or
construct projects around the world, such as the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, and
the Bureau of Reclamation.59
III. LUJAN V. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE
A. Procedural Background
Disturbed by the implications of the revised regulation, three en-
vironmental groups ("the Defenders") 6 filed suit on August 27, 1986,
seeking to overturn it.61 A Minnesota District Court dismissed the
case for lack of standing, finding no case or controversy existed.
62
The court held that the Defenders' mere interest in the enforcement
and administration of the ESA was not an injury sufficient to confer
55. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1984).
56. Parenteau, supra note 1.
57. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1986).
58. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,929 (1986).
59. Parenteau, supra note 1.
60. Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals and Their Environment, and The Humane
Society of the United States.
61. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43 (D. Minn. 1987).
62. Id. at 44.
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standing. 63 However, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, con-
cluding that the Defenders had alleged a sufficient injury for standing
purposes in their affidavits 64
On remand, the district court determined that Congress had in-
tended the ESA's consultation requirement to apply to all federal ac-
tivities, including those in foreign countries.65 The court found the
1986 regulation contrary to Congress' clear intent in enacting the
ESA and granted summary judgment in favor of the Defenders."
The district court ordered the Secretary of the Interior to reinstate
regulations mandating consultation for agency action affecting endan-
gered or threatened species, wherever found. 67 The Department of
Interior appealed the case to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the
district court's decision in all respects.6 However, on May 13, 1991,
the United States Supreme Court granted the government's petition
for writ of certiorari and subsequently reversed the Eighth Circuit's
decision. 69
B. The Eighth Circuit Decision
The Defenders of Wildlife case raised two separate issues. The
first was whether the environmental organizations had standing to
challenge the 1986 regulation issued by the Secretary of the Interior.
The second issue was whether the Secretary's interpretation of the
ESA's consultation provision was consistent with congressional
intent.
1. Court Access for Environmental Plaintiffs
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the authority
of the federal courts to hear actual "cases" or "controversies,"
70
thereby precluding the courts from intruding into "areas committed
to other branches of government."' 71 The doctrine of standing is just
63. Id. at 46.
64. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988).
65. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989), aff'd, 911 F.2d
117 (8th Cir. 1990), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1086.
68. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, III S. Ct. 2008
(1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
69. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, cert granted, III S. Ct. 2008 (1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2130 (1992).
70. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
71. Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1038 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
1992]
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one aspect of justiciability that stems from Article 111.72 Standing fo-
cuses on the particular party who requests adjudication of an issue.
An appropriate litigant must have "a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues. '73 The policy behind standing is to ensure
that courts will decide important issues against the backdrop of a fully
developed factual record. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United,7 4 the Supreme Court held that "at an irreducible mini-
mum," Article III standing requires a plaintiff to show [1] an "actual
or threatened injury" (injury in fact),7 5 [2] that the injury "can be
traced to the challenged action" (causation) and [3] that the injury "is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" (redressability).
76
In addition to these constitutional requirements, courts may im-
pose prudential limitations on a litigant's ability to bring a claim.
77
However, Congress has the authority to statutorily waive any pruden-
tial limitations, thereby granting certain litigants access to the
courts.7 8 For example, the Defenders brought their claims under the
ESA's citizen suit provision which provides that any person may com-
mence a suit to enjoin anyone who allegedly violates the statute.
7 9
Courts have interpreted citizen suit provisions in environmental
statutes as evidence of congressional intent to waive prudential con-
siderations.8 0 Therefore, the Defenders had to satisfy only the consti-
72. Mootness, ripeness, and political questions are other Article III doctrines which limit
the power of the judiciary. Id
73. Id. (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72
(1978) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).
74. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
75. Id. at 472 (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99
(1979)).
76. Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38
(1976)).
77. Prudential limitations do not stem from the Constitution, but are court-imposed limi-
tations. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (plaintiffs cannot assert the rights
or interests of third parties).
78. See Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1039 ("Unlike the constitutional requirements, Congress may
eliminate prudential limitations by legislation"); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
732 n.3 (1972) ("[W]here a dispute is otherwise justiciable, the question whether the litigant is
a 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue,' is one within the power of
Congress to determine." (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968))).
79. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
80. See Katherine B. Steuer & Robin L. Juni, Court Access for Environmental Plaintiffs:
Standing Doctrine in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 187,
231-32 (1991) (noting that "most courts have found prudential considerations superfluous to
citizen's suit standing challenges").
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tutional requirements for standing.81
The court of appeals held that the Defenders had established in-
jury in fact on two grounds.8 2 First, the Defenders had alleged a sub-
stantive injury: the increasing extinction rate of endangered species in
foreign countries where specific agency projects were ongoing.83 De-
fenders' affidavits listed pending and current projects in foreign coun-
tries that were likely to harm endangered species. The specific
governmental projects targeted by the Defenders included several for-
eign projects that had never been subjected to the ESA's consultation
procedure. 84 For example, the Mahaweli water resource project in Sri
Lanka, funded by Agency for International Development ("AID"),
endangers such species as the Indian elephant, mugger crocodile,
leopard and python.85 The Bureau of Reclamation's Aswan High
Dam project in Egypt threatens the endangered Nile crocodile.8 6
AID's Picchis-Palcazu community forest project in Peru also threat-
ens such endangered species as the jaguar, uakari and Geoldi's
marmoset.87
In sworn affidavits, members of the Defenders stated that they
had visited and intended to return to these sites to view the wildlife.88
In Sierra Club v. Morton,8 9 the United States Supreme Court broad-
ened the category of injuries to include a plaintiff's interest in aes-
thetic, conservational and recreational values. 9° However, a party
seeking review must still have personally suffered an injury.91 Apply-
81. Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1039.
82. The court did not address the requirements of traceability and redressability because
they were not challenged by the Secretary of the Interior. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at
119.
83. Id
84. Although these projects were initiated before the revised rule limiting consultation
was promulgated, the Circuit Court recognized the ongoing need for projects to require addi-
tional consultation that would never occur under the new rule. Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1042.
85. Id at 1041. See also Sean Kelly, A Global Endangered Species Act?; Court Decides
Law Applies to Federally Funded Projects Outside U.S., WASH. POsT, Aug. 16, 1990, at A21.
86. Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1041-42.
87. Id at 1041.
88. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 120. For example, Amy Skilbred, a member of the
Defenders, stated that she had visited Sri Lanka to observe the wildlife and planned to return
there in the future. She alleged that she would suffer harm as a result of the Mahaweli pro-
ject's impact on the wildlife in that area. Similarly, Joyce Kelly, president of Defenders, stated
that she had visited and intended to return to the area in Egypt where the Bureau of Reclama-
tion's Aswan High Dam project was situated. Id.
89. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
90. Id at 738.
91. Id at 735.
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ing this standard, the court found that the members here would suffer
harm if the regulation remained in effect. According to the court,
"[a]n interest in aesthetic, conservational, and recreational values will
support standing when an organizational plaintiff alleges that its
members use the area and will be adversely affected."
'92
The court of appeals distinguished the Defenders' situation from
a recent United States Supreme Court decision on standing for envi-
ronmental plaintiffs, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation.93 In Na-
tional Wildlife Federation, a wildlife protection organization sought to
challenge the Bureau of Land Management's program to reclassify
approximately 180 million acres of public land to allow for mining
activities under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.94 In that
case, the Supreme Court held that the environmental group did not
have standing to challenge the agency action.95 The Court found the
members' affidavits deficient because they failed to establish that the
members used the specific land affected by the challenged agency ac-
tion.96 In contrast, members of the Defenders asserted that they had
visited the specific project sites for the purpose of studying endan-
gered species.97 Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that the Defenders sat-
isfied the geographical nexus necessary to establish injury by
"provid[ing] specific facts, as opposed to claiming use of unspecified
portions of immense tracts of land upon which the governmental ac-
tivity may or may not occur, as was the case in National Wildlife
Fed'n."98
The Eighth Circuit also found that the Defenders satisfied stand-
ing "by demonstrating a procedural injury based upon the Secretary's
failure to follow the required consultation procedure." 99 The Eighth
Circuit noted that various appellate courts have "recognized that fail-
ure to comply with required procedures may constitute injury in
92. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 120 (quoting Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1040).
93. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
94. Id at 3183-84.
95. 1d at 3189.
96. Because the plaintiff's affidavits claimed use of land "in the vicinity" of the agency
action, rather than use of the specific land implicated in the agency action, the Supreme Court
held that the affidavits were insufficient to confer standing. Id at 3187-88.
97. See Brief for Respondents, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, cert granted, 111 S. Ct.
2008 (1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 90-1424), available in LEXIS, Genfed library,
Briefs file [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
98. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 121.
99. Id
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fact." 100 In this case, the court found that the legislature intended the
ESA to impose statutory duties that would in turn create "correlative
procedural rights in a given plaintiff, the invasion of which is sufficient
to satisfy the requirement of injury in fact in article III."101 There-
fore, the Secretary's refusal to require section 7 consultation for fed-
eral actions in foreign countries constituted a procedural injury.10 2
Based on evidence of both a substantive and procedural injury, the
Defenders established standing to challenge the revised consultation
requirement.
2. Extraterritorial Application of the ESA
After determining that the Defenders had standing, the court of
appeals turned to the merits of the Defenders' claim. The Defenders
alleged that the government's actions abroad should be subject to the
ESA's consultation provision.103 Arguing that the ESA should not
extend extraterritorially, the Secretary of the Interior claimed that its
regulations interpreting the ESA were entitled to deference according
to the Supreme Court's two-part test in Chevron, US.A., Inc. v.
NRDC.104 In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that when a court
reviews an agency's interpretation of the statute that it administers, a
court must first determine whether Congress has addressed the pre-
cise issue.105 If congressional intent is clear from the plain language
of the statute, the court must give effect to the express intent of Con-
gress. 0 6 However, if the statute is ambiguous or silent on the issue,
the court must determine whether the agency has interpretated the
statute reasonably.10 7
In applying this two-part test, the Eighth Circuit examined the
language of the ESA for a clearly expressed congressional intent to
apply the consultation provision to agency actions in foreign coun-
100. Id at 119. See, e.g., Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 421, 428 (1st Cir. 1983);
South East Lake View Neighbors v. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 685 F.2d 1027, 1038-39
(7th Cir. 1982); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670-72 (9th Cir. 1975).
101. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 121 (quoting Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622,
630 (9th Cir. 1988)). The court believed that both the citizen suit provision and the Act's
ambitious purpose "support[ed] a construction that Congress intended to bestow procedural
rights upon environmental organizations such as Defenders." Id
102. See id
103. Id. at 118.
104. Id at 122. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
105. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
106. Id.
107. Id
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tries. 08 The consultation provision of the ESA states:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assist-
ance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or
carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the con-
tinued existence of any species or result in the destruction or ad-
verse modification of habitat of such species .... 109
Although the statute does not expressly mandate extraterritorial ap-
plication, the court reasoned that Congress' use of expansive language
"admits to no exceptions."' 10 Recognizing, however, that the use of
all-inclusive language in this one section was not dispositive of the
issue, the court examined other provisions of the Act for further indi-
cations of congressional intent."'
The court noted that in section 2 of the ESA, Congress declares
that "the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the
international community to conserve ...various species of fish or
wildlife and plants facing extinction."'" 2 This section identifies at
least six international treaties ratified by the United States in an effort
to conserve endangered species." 3 In section 3, the Act defines "en-
dangered species" without reference to any geographic limitation. 14
Additionally, under section 4, the Secretary must take into account
"those efforts, if any, being made by any State or foreign nation.., to
protect such species"" 5 when classifying a species as endangered or
threatened. Furthermore, under section 4, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior is required to publish a list of all species determined to be
threatened or endangered, including both foreign and domestic spe-
108. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 122.
109. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
110. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 122.
111. Id
112. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) (1988).
113. The following international treaties are referenced in the ESA:
(A) migratory bird treaties with Canada and Mexico;
(B) the Migratory and Endangered Bird Treaty with Japan;
(C) the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western
Hemisphere;
(D) the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries;
(E) the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean;
(F) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora ....
Id.
114. Id. § 1532(6).
115. Id § 1533(b)(1XA).
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cies.1 6 "As of May 1989, of the 1,046 species listed as endangered or
threatened, 507 were species whose range is outside the United States.
In addition, there are 71 listed species whose range includes both
United States and foreign territory."' 17 It is this list that determines
which species are entitled to protection under the Act.
The ESA also contains a section entitled "International Coopera-
tion" which demonstrates that the United States' commitment to the
worldwide protection of endangered and threatened species "will be
backed by financial assistance, personnel assignments, investigations,
and by encouraging foreign nations to develop their own conservation
programs."118 The Secretary of the Interior argued that this section
should be viewed independently from the rest of the Act, as encom-
passing Congress' complete response to the international problem of
protecting endangered species."19 However, the court was unper-
suaded that this one provision could be "so neatly excised from the
larger statutory scheme."'
20
Based on the foregoing, the Eighth Circuit determined that the
plain language of the Act showed clear congressional intent that the
Act should extend extraterritorially. According to the court, when
viewed as a whole, the Act clearly demonstrated a congressional com-
mitment to worldwide conservation efforts.12' The court held that
limiting the consultation duty to protect only domestic endangered
species "runs contrary to such a commitment."122 Thus, the court
concluded that under the Chevron standard, it owed no judicial defer-
ence to the Secretary's construction of the Act. The court stated that
"[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construc-
tion and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary
to clear congressional intent."'
23
Once the court found that the language of the ESA expressed a
clear congressional intent to apply the Act extraterritorially, the court
could have ended its analysis. However, the court chose to reinforce
its conclusion by examining the legislative history of the ESA.' 24
116. Id § 1533(c).
117. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 123 (citing Appellee's Brief).
118. Id; see 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1988).
119. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 123.
120. Id
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id
124. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 123.
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The court observed that after Congress passed the original ESA
in 1973, the Secretary of the Interior initiated a rulemaking process to
implement the Act. 125 At this time, the section 7 consultation provi-
sion was subjected to extensive commentary. 126 The final rule for this
provision, published on January 4, 1978, stated: "Section 7 ... re-
quires every Federal agency to insure that its activities or programs in
the United States, upon the high seas, and in foreign countries, will
not jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species."' 127 Soon
after the Department of Interior issued its regulations, Congress
amended the consultation section, but made no substantive changes to
it. 128 Thus, the court concluded that at the time of the amendment,
congressional awareness of the "existing law," which required consul-
tation on foreign projects, reflected "tacit approval of the prior
regulation." 12
9
Therefore, based on both the express language and the legislative
history of the ESA, the Eighth Circuit found the revised regulation,
which eliminated consultation for agency action abroad, contrary to
clear congressional intent. 130 Although the Secretary of the Interior
urged that this construction would be an intrusion upon the sover-
eignty of foreign nations, the court noted that the ESA affects the
actions of federal agencies, not the actions of sovereign nations.'13
The consultation requirement places no limits on foreign countries
taking their own actions, independent of United States involvement.
Furthermore, the court stated that it is Congress' responsibility, not
the courts, to determine whether the "concern for foreign relations
outweighs its concern for foreign wildlife."' 132
The Secretary also argued that the court should defer to the De-
partment's construction of the Act based upon the presumption
against extraterritorial application of United States laws established in
125. Id.
126. The Army Corps of Engineers, the State Department and the Defense Department
opposed extraterritorial application, while the Council on Environmental Quality, the Interior
Department Solicitor's Office and the General Counsel's Office of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration urged that the consultation duty extend to foreign countries. Id.
127. I1d at 124 (citing from 42 Fed. Reg. at 4871 (1978) (emphasis added)).
128. IdM The amendments were essentially "a reorganization to allow additions to the rest
of the section." IM They did not change the application of the section in question.
129. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 124.
130. Id at 125.
131. Id.
132. Id,
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Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo.1 33 In Foley, the Supreme Court held that
United States statutes are presumed only to have domestic scope.1 34
However, this presumption can be overcome if there is clear congres-
sional intent to apply the law extraterritorially.135 As noted above,
the court found that Congress clearly expressed its intent for the law
to apply abroad.1 36
The court never reached the second prong of the Chevron analy-
sis. The court rested its decision entirely upon the first prong of the
test--clear congressional intent. If the court of appeals had addressed
the second prong of Chevron, its conclusion most likely would have
remained the same. Under Chevron, an agency's interpretation of the
statute must only be reasonable to be entitled to deference. However,
the court probably would have concluded that the Department of In-
terior's decision not to extend the consultation provision to endan-
gered foreign species was unreasonable, given that the court found the
overall purpose of the Act was the protection of endangered species
around the world.
C. The Supreme Court Reversal
In reversing the Eighth Circuit decision, the Supreme Court
never reached the underlying issue of whether the consultation provi-
sion extends to federally funded projects abroad. Rather, in the ma-
jority opinion, Justice Scalia dismissed the case on procedural
grounds, holding that the Defenders lacked the requisite standing to
challenge the regulation in court.1 37 The environmental organizations
argued that they had standing based on the affidavits of two of their
members.1 38 The members' affidavits alleged that because of the
agency's noncompliance with the ESA, they would be deprived of the
opportunity to observe certain endangered species when the members
returned to the foreign development sites.1 39 In analyzing the stand-
ing issue, Justice Scalia conceded that the Defenders' "desire to use or
133. Id. See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
134. Defenders of Wildlife, 911 F.2d at 125.
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text.
137. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). Justice Scalia also held that
the Defenders "failed to demonstrate redressability." Id at 2140. He was not convinced that
requiring consultation on foreign projects would consequently effect the foreign project in a
manner that would mitigate the harm to listed species. Id. at 2140-42. However, this view did
not command a majority of Justices.
138. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
139. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2138.
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observe an animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is unde-
niably a cognizable interest for purposes of standing." 14 However,
Justice Scalia restricted the "injury in fact" test to require "not only
that listed species were in fact being threatened by funded activities
abroad, but also that one or more of [the Defenders'] members would
thereby be 'directly' affected apart from their 'special interest in th[e]
subject.' ",141 Furthermore, Justice Scalia stated that the members' in-
tent to return to the project sites "some day" to observe the endan-
gered species was not a sufficient injury.142 According to Justice
Scalia, "[s]uch 'some day' intentions - without any description of
concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day
will be - do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury
that our cases require. '1 43
The majority also rejected the argument that the Defenders had
standing based on a "procedural injury." 1 "4 The Eighth Circuit had
found that the citizen suit provision of the ESA created a procedural
right enabling the Defenders to bring a suit against the Secretary of
the Interior for failure to follow the correct consultation proce-
dures.145 However, Justice Scalia repudiated the idea that Congress
could "convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive of-
ficers' compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in
the courts" without a showing of concrete injury.'4 To permit other-
wise, Justice Scalia professed, would infringe on the idea of separation
of powers.147
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Sou-
ter, agreed that the Defenders failed to show that they were person-
ally injured by the regulation.1 48 Justice Kennedy noted that "this is
not a case where it is reasonable to assume that the [members] will be
using the sites on a regular basis."1 49 However, Justice Kennedy
wrote separately to emphasize that he would not foreclose the possi-
bility that under a different set of facts, a theory similar to the one
advanced in Defenders of Wildlife "might support a claim to stand-
140. Id. at 2137.
141. Id. at 2137-38 (emphasis added) (second alteration in original).
142. Id. at 2138.
143. Id. (emphasis in original).
144. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2142-43.
145. Id. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
146. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2145.
147. Id
148. Id at 2146.
149. Id
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ing."150 Furthermore, with regard to basing standing on a procedural
injury, Justice Kennedy wrote: "In my view, Congress has the power
to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise
to a case or controversy where none existed before... ." 1 However,
Congress must at a minimum "identify the injury it seeks to vindicate
and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.1' 52
Justice Kennedy believed the citizen suit provision of the ESA failed
to meet this minimum standard because the provision did not require
that the alleged statutory violation personally injure the plaintiff.153
According to Justice Kennedy, a person bringing suit must at least
demonstrate that they have been personally injured by the procedural
violation.
In a separate concurrence, Justice Stevens found that the De-
fenders had standing, 154 but reversed the case on its merits.155 As the
only Justice to reach the underlying issue in the case, Justice Stevens
believed that the consultation provision did not apply to agency activ-
ities in foreign countries.1 56 Applying the Foley presumption against
extraterritorial application of United States laws, Justice Stevens
wrote: "[T]he absence of any explicit statement that the consultation
requirement is applicable to agency actions in foreign countries
suggests that Congress did not intend that § 7(a)(2) apply
extraterritorially."1
5 7
In a biting dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice
O'Connor, criticized the Court for its "slash-and-bum expedition
through the law of environmental standing."158 Justice Blackmun
called the Court's demand for detailed descriptions of future visits an
"empty formality," noting that "[n]o substantial barriers prevent [the
members] from simply purchasing plane tickets to return to the As-
wan and Mahaweli projects."1 59 According to Justice Blackmun, a
150. Id.
151. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47. See infra notes 217-18 and
accompanying text.
152. Id at 2147.
153. Id.
154. According to Justice Stevens, "a person who had visited the critical habitat of an
endangered species, has a professional interest in preserving the species and its habitat, and
intends to revisit them in the future has standing to challenge agency action that threatens
their destruction." Id
155. Id.
156. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2149.
157. Id. at 2151.
158. Id at 2160.
159. Id at 2153. Justice Blackmun feared that the majority's "demand for detailed de-
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reasonable jury could assume that the members would return to the
project sites "based not only upon their statements of intent to return,
but upon their past visits to the project sites, as well as their profes-
sional backgrounds."'' 6 Therefore, in Justice Blackmun's opinion,
the affidavits contained sufficient facts to conclude that the members
would suffer a concrete, substantive injury.
The dissent also questioned the scope of the majority's language
in rejecting standing for "procedural" injuries.16 1 The majority indi-
cated that a procedural injury without an independent showing of a
concrete harm was not constitutionally cognizable. However, Justice
Blackmun noted that in complex regulatory areas, such as environ-
mental law, "Congress often legislates . . . in procedural shades of
gray."' 162 In other words, Congress is able to guide the substantive
policy goals of administrative agencies by requiring that they follow
certain procedures.1 63 As a result, some procedural duties become in-
tertwined with the prevention of a concrete, substantive harm.164 For
example, Congress designed the consultation requirement of section 7
"as an integral check on federal agency action ensuring that such ac-
tion does not go forward without full consideration of its effects on
listed species."' 65 Clearly, Congress has relied on court enforcement
of these procedures to effectuate the substantive policy goals of its
legislative acts.166 Justice Blackmun feared that the majority was at-
tempting "to impose fresh limitations on the constitutional authority
of Congress to allow citizen suits in the federal courts for injuries
deemed 'procedural' in nature."' 67 According to the dissent, "the
principal effect of foreclosing judicial enforcement of such procedures
is to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense -
not of the courts - but of Congress, from which that power
scriptions of future conduct will do little to weed out those who are genuinely harmed from
those who are not." Id
160. Id
161. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2151.
162. Id at 2158.
163. Id
164. Id at 2159.
165. Id. at 2158.
166. See Daniel A. Farber, The Global Environment and the Rehnquist Court, TRIAL,
Aug. 1992, at 76. Professor Farber states: "Congress does not authorize environmental groups
to file suit out of sympathy with the harms suffered by individual members of those groups. It
authorizes these suits because, particularly in an era of divided government, litigation ensures
that regulatory agencies follow their statutory mandates." Id
167. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2151-52.
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originates and emanates. 1 68 In Justice Blackmun's opinion, the
Court's decision "reflects an unseemly solicitude for an expansion of
power of the Executive Branch."' 69
Justice Blackmun proposed that the Court recognize that "some
classes of procedural duties are so enmeshed with the prevention of a
substantive, concrete harm that an individual plaintiff may be able to
demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of injury just through the breach of
that procedural duty."' 170 Otherwise, in any situation in which a
plaintiff could not show that he or she suffered a concrete, individual-
ized harm, a regulatory agency's deviation from its statutory mandate
would not be subject to judicial review.17' By not recognizing proce-
dural injuries, the Court is, in effect, making certain decisions of ad-
ministrative agencies judicially unreviewable.
The problem with Justice Scalia's approach is that environmental
statutes are designed to protect everybody, not just the interests of a
select few. "[T]he Endangered Species Act was not passed to protect
the interests of a few wildlife observers. It is based instead on the
view that we all have a stake in the ecosystem's integrity and the pres-
ervation of unique life forms, regardless of whether we observe them
personally."' 172 Therefore, it makes no sense to require a showing of
individual injury.
V. POLICY RESPONSES TO BIo-DIvERSITY CONCERNS AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
A. Presumption Against Extraterritoriality of Environmental Laws
In Defenders of Wildlife, the United States Supreme Court had
the opportunity to interpret the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity in an environmental context. Because the Court reversed the deci-
168. Id. at 2158.
169. Id. at 2159.
170. Id. However, as noted previously, Justice Blackmun believed that this was a case
where the plaintiffs sought judicial enforcement of a procedural requirement designed to pro-
tect a threatened, concrete interest of theirs: their interest in observing and working with en-
dangered species. Id. Consequently, in Blackmun's view, the Defenders satisfied the
majority's requirement that plaintiffs show a separate, concrete harm.
171. See Farber, supra note 166, at 76-77. In discussing the impact of Justice Scalia's
opinion on environmental law, Professor Farber notes the considerable obstacles that an envi-
ronmental organization faces in attempting to prove that its members have suffered a concrete
harm. One such example is "the difficulty that the Sierra Club might have in showing that the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's acid-rain regulations would have a discernible effect
on some individual member." Id at 77.
172. Id.
1992] 223
Loy. LA. Intl & Comp. L.J[
sion on standing grounds, the question of whether the ESA applies
extraterritorially remains an open issue. Unless Congress ultimately
resolves the issue,173 another challenge may satisfy the Court's bur-
densome standing requirements 74 and the Supreme Court will have
to decide whether the ESA applies extraterritorially.
The presumption against extraterritorial application of United
States laws became a well known canon of statutory construction in
the seminal case of Foley Bro, Inc. v. Filardo.' 5 In Foley, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Eight Hour Law 76 did not apply
to Americans employed by United States companies working in for-
eign countries. 177 The Court stated that laws are meant only to apply
within the territiorial jurisdiction of the United States, unless Con-
gress has indicated a contrary intent. 7  The Court based its holding
on the assumption "that Congress is primarily concerned with domes-
tic conditions."'
79
The most recent Supreme Court ruling on the issue of extraterri-
torial application of United States laws was also in the labor context.
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,'8 0 the Court held that Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act did not apply extraterritorially. 18' In Ara-
bian American, a United States citizen, employed by a United States
corporation in Saudi Arabia, brought a Title VII suit claiming that he
was wrongfully discharged because of his race, religion and national
origin.'8 2 The Court held that Congress did not intend Title VII pro-
tections to extend to the employment practices of United States em-
ployers abroad. 8
3
In light of the Supreme Court's narrow stance on the extraterri-
173. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
174. It is interesting to note that three Justices (Blackmun, O'Connor and Stevens) found
standing in the Lujan case, and two Justices (Kennedy and Souter), in their concurring opin-
ion, expressed a more relaxed view of standing. Therefore, a majority of Justices may be recep-
tive to granting standing in a renewed challenge to the current regulation.
175. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
176. The Eight Hour Law provided that no laborer was required to work more than eight
hours in a day, unless compensated one and one-half times the pay rate for all work in excess
of eight hours. Id at 281.
177. Id Plaintiff was an American citizen who worked for a United States contractor in
Iraq and Iran. Id He brought suit in New York to recover overtime pay in accordance with
the Eight Hour Law. Id
178. Id at 285.
179. Id
180. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
181. Id
182. Id
183. Id at 1231.
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torial application of United States law, one can reasonably predict
that the Court would be similarly unwilling to extend the reach of the
ESA. With the exception of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Defend-
ers of Wildlife, environmental groups have had little success in per-
suading lower courts to apply environmental laws extraterritorially.
The issue of extraterritoriality in environmental litigation has cen-
tered primarily on interpretations of the National Environment Pro-
tection Act ("NEPA").18 4 Like the ESA, the NEPA contains
sweeping language lacking geographical limits18 5 and calling for the
recognition of worldwide environmental problems. 8 6 However,
NEPA's broad statutory language has not overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 8
7
In National Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission ("NRDC"), 1s8 the D.C. Circuit Court limited NEPA to
domestic application in a case involving nuclear export licensing deci-
sions. Expanding on Foley, the NRDC court stated that overcomimg
the presumption against extraterritoriality required not just a clear
expression of intent, but "an unequivocal mandate from Congress."18 9
The court reasoned that if federal agencies were required to abide by
United States environmental laws abroad, their actions may "unnec-
essarily displace" the domestic regulation of the foreign nation.19°
The court's decision stressed the foreign public policy of not intruding
upon the sovereignty of other national governments when acting
overseas. ' 91
Other environmental statutes also have been subject to extraterri-
torial review. In United States v. Mitchell, the Fifth Circuit declined
to apply the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 ("MMPA") ex-
184. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(c) (1988). See Turley, supra note 2, at 628.
185. Turley, supra note 2, at 628. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(f) (1988) states: "[A]I agencies of the Federal Government shall
... recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems and... lend
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize interna-
tional cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world
environment." Id.
187. Turley, supra note 2, at 628-29.
188. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
189. Id. at 1357. The court did, however, limit its interpretation of NEPA to the facts of
the case and thus it left open the question of whether NEPA could be applicable to some other
kind of major federal action abroad. Id at 1366. For a contrary view, see Sierra Club v.
Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding NEPA applicable to Federal Highway Ad-
ministration's decision to construct highway through Panama and Columbia).
190. NRDC, 647 F.2d at 1356.
191. Id.
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traterritorially. 192 The decision in Mitchell also emphasized the sov-
ereignty of foreign nations in regulating the exploitation of their own
natural resources. 93 Overall, the lower courts tend to confine the
reach of environmental legislation.
The problem with the approach taken by the courts in these cases
is that circumstances have changed dramatically since the United
States Supreme Court handed down its Foley decision in 1949. The
world has gradually become more interdependent, and the United
States can no longer afford to have an "isolationist mentality."'' 94 The
underlying premise upon which Foley is based is simply not valid in
an environmental context. In Foley, the Supreme Court noted that
labor laws are primarily a local concern. 195 Thus, to apply United
States employment laws in foreign nations could create a conflict be-
tween the interests of the United States and the interests of foreign
nations. 196 In contrast, environmental issues are by nature an interna-
tional concern because environmental problems recognize no bounda-
ries. While there is little evidence that Congress ever intended United
States labor laws to extend to foreign countries, there is abundant evi-
dence in the ESA that Congress intended to protect endangered spe-
cies worldwide.
An additional argument for applying the ESA extraterritorially
is that courts have held that adverse domestic effects may be sufficient
to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of
United States laws. In other words, federal statutes have been applied
to regulate actions outside of the United States if those actions would
cause harmful effects within the United States. 197 Applying this "ef-
192. 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977). The court reversed the conviction of an American
citizen who captured dolphins off the coast of the Bahamas in violation of the MMPA. Id. at
997.
193. Id. at 1002.
194. Turley, supra note 2, at 657.
195. Foley, 336 U.S. at 286.
196. It is interesting to note that the administrative record in Defenders of Wildlife did not
contain a single comment from a foreign government expressing any concern about the effect
of applying the ESA to United States agency actions abroad. See Brief for Respondents, supra
note 97.
197. See Brief of Amici Curiae Ecotropica Foundation of Brazil, Slovak Union of Nature
and Landscape Protectors, Fundacion De Parques Nacionales of Costa Rica, and Greenpeace
International in Support of Respondents, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife cert granted, 111 S.
Ct. 2008 (1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No. 90-1424), available in LEXIS, Genfed
library, Briefs file [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Ecotropica Foundation of Brazil]; see,
e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (applying Lanham Act, which regulates
deceptive and misleading use of trademarks, to acts committed in Mexico because they "radi-
ated" effects in United States); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
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fects" test to the ESA, federal action that occurs in a foreign country
would definitely have significant effects in the United States. For ex-
ample, there are many migratory species protected under the ESA
that spend part of the year in the United States and then migrate to
foreign countries or waters. 198 For instance, the golden-checked war-
bler, an endangered migratory bird, spends the spring and summer
months in Texas, and then migrates south to Guatemala in the au-
tumn and winter months.199 While the bird is in the United States, it
is protected under the ESA. But under the Secretary of the Interior's
interpretation of the ESA's consultation provision, the warbler will
not receive the same protection in Guatemala. Currently, a major
pesticide spraying program in Guatemala, federally funded by the
United States Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
("APHIS"), may adversely effect this species. 20o APHIS has not con-
sulted with the Secretary of the Interior regarding the effects of its
pesticide program20 1 and is presently under no obligation to do so.
Thus, the current interpretation of the ESA makes any conservation
efforts in the United States for these types of migratory species futile.
In addition, federal action abroad that harms non-migratory spe-
cies found in both the United States and foreign territory may also
have adverse effects in the United States. 20 2 To the extent that federal
action abroad reduces the range of a species that also exists in the
United States, the burden of protecting that species will fall more
heavily upon the United States.20 3 If the population of a species is
being depleted in a foreign country, then under the ESA, the United
States would carry the obligation of ensuring that the same species in
the United States does not become extinct. Thus, protecting a species'
U.S. 690 (1962) (holding that Sherman Act applies to acts of United States corporations in
Canada that had effects in United States).
198. The whooping crane, peregrine falcon, gray whale, humpback whale and Kemp's
ridley sea turtle are some examples of the species protected under the Act which migrate to
foreign territories. Brief of Amici Curiae City of Austin, Texas; Travis County, Texas; Am.
Soc'y for the Protection of Nature in Israel; Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc.; Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n;
World Wildlife Fund; Sierra Club; and Fundacion Natura in Support of Respondents, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (No.
90-1424), available in LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae
City of Austin, Texas].
199. Id.
200. Id
201. Id.
202. Id
203. See Brief of Amici Curiae City of Austin, Texas, supra note 198.
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survival in a foreign country would lessen the conservation efforts
needed to protect the same species here in the United States.
The effect of abandoning the consultation duty for federal
projects in foreign countries will have strong repercussions in the
United States. The loss of species in other countries also will effect
both economic and medical advances in this country. 2° 4 Therefore,
under an effects analysis, the ESA should be applied extraterritorially.
In contemporary society, all environmental statutes should pre-
sumptively apply extraterritorially. Today, "Congress is increasingly
required to legislate solutions to global environmental threats. '205
When Foley was decided the nation was not yet concerned with envi-
ronmental issues, and there were few environmental laws. 20 6 Today,
transnational environmental concerns are abundant. After a series of
environmental tragedies, 20 7 the world's attention has now shifted to
protection of the global environment, and the Supreme Court's inter-
pretion of the ESA should reflect this understanding.
B. International Response to Environmental Concerns
In an attempt to cope with global environmental problems, sev-
eral nations have participated in various international conventions
and treaties.20 8 However in June 1992, the largest world community
convention on environmental matters,2°9 the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development, met in Brazil. The confer-
ence "brought together 178 nations and more than 115 heads of state
204. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
205. Brief of Amici Curiae Ecotropica Foundation of Brazil, supra note 197. See, e.g.,
International Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991, S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Waste
Export Control Act, H.R. 2358, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
206. Turley, supra note 2, at 658. "[Mlost environmental statutes are direct products of
the rise of environmental political consciousness in the late 1960s and 1970s." Id n.387.
207. In 1984, the world witnessed the worst industrial disaster in history when a Union
Carbide plant in Bhopal, India exploded killing 2,000 people and injuring 200,000. Develop-
ments in the Law - International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1487 (1991).
In 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in the Soviet Union caused a transboundary
effect. Id. Also in 1986, a Swiss warehouse went up in flames resulting in thirty tons of chemi-
cals being washed into the Rhine River. ItL
208. Id. The Montreal Protocol and the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone
Layer are examples of international cooperation in efforts to monitor and reduce the effects of
ozone depletion. Id at 1487 n.5.
209. Id. at 1489. There has not been a global conference of this scope on the environment
since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. Id. at
1580. The Stockholm Conference was the first time that the global community organized a
system of international cooperation. Id at 1580 n.4.
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in a sprawling convention center on the outskirts of Rio. ' 210 The con-
ference promoted environmentally sound development in all coun-
tries, making it "the first great diplomatic effort of the post-Cold War
era."'21 1 The issue of biological diversity played center stage at the
Earth Summit, and the Bush Administration's refusal to sign the bi-
odiversity treaty made the United States the only major country not
to support the treaty. 212 The biological diversity treaty, which aims at
protecting threatened plants and animal species around the world,
was designed "to give developing nations an economic stake in con-
serving their forests and species. '21 3 President Bush has been harshly
criticized by environmentalists and other countries for his decision
not to sign the treaty.214 Ironically, the President's unpopular stance
against the biodiversity treaty came at the same time as the Supreme
Court's anti-environmental ruling in Defenders of Wildlife.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Limiting Court Access to Environmental Plaintiffs
The Supreme Court's decision in Defenders of Wildlife is a con-
tinuation of the Court's increasingly strict rules on standing, making
it more difficult for environmental groups to challenge actions in this
country as well as abroad.2' 5 The ruling is indicative of the Rehnquist
Court's inclination "to defer to the wishes of the executive branch
rather than Congress. ' 216  Congress is currently considering
reauthorization of the ESA, and in response to the Court's decision,
Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum has introduced a bill amending
the citizen suit provision to define what would constitute an injury
under the Act.217 The proposed bill would grant standing to anyone
210. Maura Dolan & Rudy Abramson, Earth Summit Ends on Note of Hope, Not Achieve-
ment, L.A. TIMEs, June 14, 1992, at Al.
211. Id.
212. See Steven Greenhouse, A Closer Look, Ecology, the Economy and Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 1992, § 4, at 1. President Bush feared that the treaty's ambiguous language would
damage the biotechnology industry. Id.
213. Dolan & Abramson, supra note 210.
214. See Ruth Marcus, Justices Make It Harder to Press Environmental Enforcement
Cases, WASH. POST, June 13, 1992, at A4.
215. See id.
216. Savage, supra note 8.
217. S. 2953, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The bill would revise the citizen suit provision
as follows:
A person who has by studying, visiting, or other means demonstrated an aesthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, professional, recreational, or scientific interest in
an endangered or threatened species shall be deemed to suffer a direct and particular-
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"who has by studying, visiting, or other means demonstrated an aes-
thetic, ecological, educational, historical, professional, recreational, or
scientific interest in an endangered or threatened species. ' 218 The bill
also would amend the consultation provision to apply to federally
funded projects abroad.
21 9
B. United States Should Adhere to the Same Conservation Practices
Abroad as It Does at Home
The Bush Administration has continued to support the 1986 pol-
icy that federal agencies need not consult with the appropriate agency
regarding the effect that its overseas projects may have on endangered
wildlife. 220 While the ESA cannot prevent all species extinction, it is a
step in the right direction. International treaties and conventions may
prove to be a more effective means for worldwide species protection.
However, the United States government has refused to sign the only
comprehensive international treaty on biological diversity in effect to-
day. It is hypocritical for the United States government to sympa-
thize with the international need to protect global diversity while
simultaneously allowing its federal agencies to destroy wildlife in
other countries through actions that would be prohibited in this coun-
try. If the United States desires to remain a world leader in conserva-
tion, it must demonstrate its commitment to biodiversity through its
actions abroad as well as at home.
The ESA was enacted due to the concern of species extinction
around the world, not just in the United States. The Congressional
Record indicates that the Act was designed to prevent the further
extinction of the world's species. 221 Because it is evident from the
language of the ESA and its legislative history that Congress placed
ized injury in any instance in which any person, including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or agency, takes action that may harm or ad-
versely affect any threatened or endangered species, or result in the destruction or
adverse modification of the critical habitat of the species. A reasonable likelihood of
action or a proposal to act shall be considered a sufficient threat to constitute an
injury under this paragraph.
Id § 4.
218. Id. § 4.
219. The proposal to amend section 7(a) adds the following paragraph: "(5) The provi-
sions of this section shall apply to any agency action with respect to any species listed under
this Act as an endangered or threatened species carried out, in whole or in part, in the United
States, in a foreign country, or on the high seas." S. 2953, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1992).
220. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Limits Legal Standing in Suits, N.Y. TIMEs, June 13,
1992, § 1, at 12.
221. S. REP. No. 307, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989.
"It has become increasingly apparent that some sort of protective measures must be taken to
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great significance on worldwide protection of species, the ESA should
not be confined to the geographical limits of the United States. More
importantly, in order to halt the loss of biodiversity, endangered spe-
cies must be protected worldwide. Therefore, the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Defenders of Wildlife was a step back-
ward in the struggle to preserve global diversity.
Wendy S. Albers*
prevent the further extinction of many of the world's animal species." Id. at 2990 (emphasis
added).
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